My column this past Sunday produced plenty of push-back. This is a good thing; it forces me to think deeper about my decision making and whether there are logic gaps I can't defend. And if I can't defend them, why share them?
So these past couple days I've been thinking more about that first mock draft of the summer, when I picked A.J. Green and Tyler Boyd in the fourth and fifth rounds. Are the naysayers right? In trying to prove a point about implementing a coherent-yet-flexible draft strategy ("Process over outcome" in the words of long-time FF4W community member Johnny Green, Jr.), did I undercut my argument by "reaching" for two overvalued receivers?
And that got me thinking about why, in that moment of an irrelevant mock draft--though one I had committed to sharing with readers regardless of its outcome--did I choose to hedge on these Bengal teammates? Wasn't there more upside to be found elsewhere? What point was I trying to make to myself and to anyone who might listen? Because drafting is both a skill and subjective. While some people are better at it than others, it's never immediately clear who "won" a draft. Sure, we can guess based ADP or whatever rankings we're using. But really, a draft "grade" can't be assessed until the dust settles on the regular season.
When I took James Conner late in both my drafts last year, those picks likely would have been viewed as "dumb" had Le'Veon Bell returned before the start of the season. But Bell never returned, making my Conner picks look brilliant. Conversely, I drafted David Johnson first overall the summer after his monster 2015 season. Had I gone with someone else, people would have thought I was crazy. A few plays into the 2016 season, he was knocked out for the year, making my draft look pretty bad.
So back to process. Why hedge on two players from the same team? Why not go with "best available" every time?
Here's why: Since fantasy success is never guaranteed, players shouldn't be drafted in a vacuum. Most years, at least half of all preseason RB1s are not RB1 performers that season. The same is often true for the other core offensive positions. If you drafted at the end of the first round of a 14-team draft last summer and chose two universally viewed back-end RB1s like Leonard Fournette and Jordan Howard, you would have ended up disappointed. If you'd grabbed universally undraftable RBs like James White and Phillip Lindsay late, you very well could have dominated.
Looking ahead to 2019, if anyone knows of an RB outside the preseason top 50 who will score more points than a preseason RB1 . . . well, you belong in Vegas.
When it comes down to it, every pick should focus on two criteria: Does this player have huge upside, and can I afford to risk taking that player given my current roster? And that's why hedging--drafting someone a little too soon--sometimes makes sense.
In last year's FF4W Premier League draft, I hedged on Green Bay's backfield at the round 8/9 turn, picking RB-38 Jamaal Williams and the suspended RB-49 Aaron Jones. Based on ADP, Jones shouldn't have been picked for another 2-3 rounds. But I reached early for a simple, coherent reason: One of these two guys had a good chance of eventually leading the Packers' backfield. So even though I passed on "better" players, I was willing to burn two picks on essentially one player--whichever RB ended up helping my team. Obviously, it worked out.
So back to Green and Boyd. Why would we ever hedge on two receivers from the same team? Well, these two guys are an interesting tandem. Prior to last season, Green was a perennial WR1: top 10 in 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2017 and #4 points per game in 2016. Whenever he returns from his ankle injury, he'll be a terrific bet for WR2 production and a solid bet for top-14 production. Meanwhile, Boyd is an ascending 24-year-old talent who was the 17th best WR scorer last year despite missing two contests.
The hedge here is critically important. Choosing Green and not Boyd is dicey because Green is a greater-than-normal re-injury risk even when he returns (and no one really knows when he'll be 100% healthy). The payoff is great, but the risks are too. And choosing Boyd but not Green might pay off in the short term, but if/when Green returns, Boyd might revert to a #2 role. We simply don't know how this pair will play out. What we do know is that one of them is a great bet for top-16 production any given week. So I'm willing to burn a fifth-round pick to double my odds of securing that production.
Finally, one reader lamented Sunday that I should have taken someone like Dante Pettis instead of Boyd--that Pettis is a far more reliable option. This reinforces my point--that none of us know how these players will perform. It's all guess work based on whatever research and intelligence we bring to the table. In the 48 hours since Pettis was hyped over Boyd, Niners' head coach Kyle Shanahan warned that Pettis still hasn't locked up a starting job.
So while it's easy to say that this guy's far better than that guy, we simply can't predict what will happen. And that's why thoughtful hedging works. I don't suggest hedging all the time, most of the time, or even some of the time. But if I can spot an opportunity to increase the odds of landing one high-impact player--even if it means burning an extra mid-round or late-round pick--I'd do it in a heartbeat.
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So these past couple days I've been thinking more about that first mock draft of the summer, when I picked A.J. Green and Tyler Boyd in the fourth and fifth rounds. Are the naysayers right? In trying to prove a point about implementing a coherent-yet-flexible draft strategy ("Process over outcome" in the words of long-time FF4W community member Johnny Green, Jr.), did I undercut my argument by "reaching" for two overvalued receivers?
And that got me thinking about why, in that moment of an irrelevant mock draft--though one I had committed to sharing with readers regardless of its outcome--did I choose to hedge on these Bengal teammates? Wasn't there more upside to be found elsewhere? What point was I trying to make to myself and to anyone who might listen? Because drafting is both a skill and subjective. While some people are better at it than others, it's never immediately clear who "won" a draft. Sure, we can guess based ADP or whatever rankings we're using. But really, a draft "grade" can't be assessed until the dust settles on the regular season.
When I took James Conner late in both my drafts last year, those picks likely would have been viewed as "dumb" had Le'Veon Bell returned before the start of the season. But Bell never returned, making my Conner picks look brilliant. Conversely, I drafted David Johnson first overall the summer after his monster 2015 season. Had I gone with someone else, people would have thought I was crazy. A few plays into the 2016 season, he was knocked out for the year, making my draft look pretty bad.
So back to process. Why hedge on two players from the same team? Why not go with "best available" every time?
Here's why: Since fantasy success is never guaranteed, players shouldn't be drafted in a vacuum. Most years, at least half of all preseason RB1s are not RB1 performers that season. The same is often true for the other core offensive positions. If you drafted at the end of the first round of a 14-team draft last summer and chose two universally viewed back-end RB1s like Leonard Fournette and Jordan Howard, you would have ended up disappointed. If you'd grabbed universally undraftable RBs like James White and Phillip Lindsay late, you very well could have dominated.
Looking ahead to 2019, if anyone knows of an RB outside the preseason top 50 who will score more points than a preseason RB1 . . . well, you belong in Vegas.
When it comes down to it, every pick should focus on two criteria: Does this player have huge upside, and can I afford to risk taking that player given my current roster? And that's why hedging--drafting someone a little too soon--sometimes makes sense.
In last year's FF4W Premier League draft, I hedged on Green Bay's backfield at the round 8/9 turn, picking RB-38 Jamaal Williams and the suspended RB-49 Aaron Jones. Based on ADP, Jones shouldn't have been picked for another 2-3 rounds. But I reached early for a simple, coherent reason: One of these two guys had a good chance of eventually leading the Packers' backfield. So even though I passed on "better" players, I was willing to burn two picks on essentially one player--whichever RB ended up helping my team. Obviously, it worked out.
So back to Green and Boyd. Why would we ever hedge on two receivers from the same team? Well, these two guys are an interesting tandem. Prior to last season, Green was a perennial WR1: top 10 in 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2017 and #4 points per game in 2016. Whenever he returns from his ankle injury, he'll be a terrific bet for WR2 production and a solid bet for top-14 production. Meanwhile, Boyd is an ascending 24-year-old talent who was the 17th best WR scorer last year despite missing two contests.
The hedge here is critically important. Choosing Green and not Boyd is dicey because Green is a greater-than-normal re-injury risk even when he returns (and no one really knows when he'll be 100% healthy). The payoff is great, but the risks are too. And choosing Boyd but not Green might pay off in the short term, but if/when Green returns, Boyd might revert to a #2 role. We simply don't know how this pair will play out. What we do know is that one of them is a great bet for top-16 production any given week. So I'm willing to burn a fifth-round pick to double my odds of securing that production.
Finally, one reader lamented Sunday that I should have taken someone like Dante Pettis instead of Boyd--that Pettis is a far more reliable option. This reinforces my point--that none of us know how these players will perform. It's all guess work based on whatever research and intelligence we bring to the table. In the 48 hours since Pettis was hyped over Boyd, Niners' head coach Kyle Shanahan warned that Pettis still hasn't locked up a starting job.
So while it's easy to say that this guy's far better than that guy, we simply can't predict what will happen. And that's why thoughtful hedging works. I don't suggest hedging all the time, most of the time, or even some of the time. But if I can spot an opportunity to increase the odds of landing one high-impact player--even if it means burning an extra mid-round or late-round pick--I'd do it in a heartbeat.
---
Sign up for Pre-Draft Top 300 Rankings: http://www.fantasyfootballforwinners.com/
Follow on Twitter: https://twitter.com/_FF4W